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Legitimation crisis of state socialism
The Balkans vis-à-vis the Visegrád countries
Fatos Tarifa
1 Although it was arguably well justified and legitimized for millions of Soviets and East
Europeans  who  passionately  believed  in  Communist  ideals,  the  Communist  system
forfeited  much  of  its  legitimacy  long  before  its  final  collapse.  In  the  early  1970s,
Kolakowski described the Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe as systems
dying « a slow political death »1. After all, the legitimacy of Communist systems that was
once a product of a revolutionary past, the glorious victory over the fascists and the Nazis
at  the  end  of  World  War  II,  could  not  have  been  justifiable  and  unquestionable  on
ideological  grounds  alone  for  too  long.  It  was,  indeed,  seriously  questioned  and
undermined when state  socialism and the  Communist  parties  throughout  the  region
proved  unable  to  realize  the  societas  perfecta  they  once  promised  their  citizens  and
consolidated their powers due to the ruthlessness with which they pursued this aim and
the thoroughness with which most of these regimes were made into virtual copies of the
Soviet  system. Alfred Meyer called this  process of  draining of  content of  Communist
ideology the « withering away of utopia »2. This gap doubtless was for a long time a major
cause of political strain in all Communist-ruled countries. And, even if only vaguely, such
strain  was  felt  not  only  by  intellectuals  and  the  working  people,  but  also  by  many
officials,  thus  contributing  to  a  continuous  growth  of  legitimation  crisis.  Although
gradual  and  not  uniform,  this  unavoidably  drained  the  political  legitimacy  of  state
socialism.
 
Legitimation crisis
2 Genuine legitimation crises in the sense of various kinds of unrest among the population
and within the Communist parties and, more importantly, large-scale upheavals in which
blood was spilled, repeatedly broke out in several East European countries : in the GDR in
1953, in Poland and Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and again in Poland, the
most maverick and rebellious of all  Soviet-bloc countries,  on a number of occasions :
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1970, 1976, and most notably in 1980-1981. All these major events represented authentic
working-class movements, with general strikes, factory occupations, elections of worker’s
committees,  etc.  In  spite  of  their individual  characteristics  they  expressed  but  one
message : large segments of the working class and the intellectuals had lost faith in state
socialism and regarded their Communist leaderships as being corrupt, hence illegitimate
to rule.
3 Piven  and  Cloward3 and  Oberschall 4 suggest  that  mobilization  and  collective  action
against any authority occur particularly when the legitimacy of its policies and practices
is  called  into  question.  However,  one  should  not  underestimate  the  changes  in  the
political opportunity structure when Stalin’s iron fist was no longer there to remind East
Europeans that any move from the status quo would had been harshly sanctioned. Several
authors5 have argued that the outbreak in Poland and the revolution in Hungary in 1956
would have been unthinkable without the prior removal of the Stalinist lid from the
boiling satellite kettle. Similarly, what happened in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989
would  have  been  difficult  to  imagine,  if  not  impossible,  had  Gorbachev’s  “Sinatra
Doctrine”  not  removed  fears  that  the  1956  and  the  1968  events  might  be  repeated.
Although the Soviet hands-off policy had not, as yet, been tested for its limits, observers
agree  that  Gorbachev’s  signals  of  welcome  reforms  in  Eastern  Europe  and  non-
intervention in  internal  affairs  were  a  crucial  factor  leading  to  the  1989  democracy
movements6.
 
The Balkans vis-à-vis the Visegrád Countries
4 Characteristically, crises of state socialism broke out mainly, and most dramatically, in
“Habsburg” Central Europe, to use Rupnik’s language. Several factors may explain this.
First,  compared  to  the  Balkan  countries,  Yugoslavia  and  Albania  in  particular,  the
Communist parties and their leaders in Central Europe had had sparse popular backing
and a much lower degree of legitimacy from the outset. While regimes in these countries
could be sustained by Soviet economic and military aid, this was at the expense of their
legitimacy and their countries’ national autonomy. 
5 Second,  communist  indoctrination in the Central  European countries  had been more
superficial,  hence,  relatively  easier  to  reverse.  For  most  people  in  these  countries
Marxism-Leninism  remained  an  alien  ideology unintegrated  into  consciousness  and
practice except in a wholly superficial manner.
6 Third, although they were under Communist authoritarian rule, the Visegrád countries
did not experience the harsh repression of the hard-line Communist states of the Balkans,
Albania and Romania in particular7.
7 Fourth, none of the Central European Communist regimes (arguably except for Poland’s
Gomulka rule) ever evolved charismatic authority through the use of their leaders’ “cult
of personality”, as was the case with Tito in Yugoslavia and Hoxha in Albania. With their
flair  and national  appeal,  the latter  were regarded as  genuinely popular leaders  and
national heroes in their respective countries. They were viewed by the masses as the
revolution incarnates,  the heroes  who miraculously had led their  peoples  out  of  the
atrocities of fascist and Nazi occupations and the backwardness of their authoritarian
past.
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8 Fifth, all the Balkan countries were indisputably more agrarian and impoverished than
their Central European counterparts. This made their economic and social achievements
during the initial phase of socialist construction look even more remarkable and granted
ample legitimacy to their Communist leaderships.  Like other Communist countries of
Central Europe, the Balkans  experienced rapid industrialization and urbanization, and a
substantial  economic  growth  in  the  1950s  and  the  1960s,  as  well  as  remarkable
improvement in their standards of living through the 1960s and the 1970s.
9 Meyer’s insightful idea that for assessing the legitimacy of power in Eastern Europe it is
important to single out the group(s) whose attitudes are most essential to maintain the
system8 is very relevant to this analysis. In virtually all the Balkan countries that group
was  the  peasantry,  which  was  not  only  the  largest  numerically,  but  also  the  most
important  social  group  in  determining  the  success  of  the  post  World  War  II  order.
Neglected  and  exploited  for  many  centuries,  the  peasants,  and  arguably  the  newly
created  industrial  working  class,  gained  more  in  the  earlier  phase  of  the  socialist
construction than any other group. As in most of Eastern Europe, the working class in
these countries resulted basically from the large migration of the rural population to
rapidly industrialized urban areas.  Because large segments  of  industrial  workers  had
their roots embedded in the countryside,  they had no political consciousness distinct
from that of the peasantry. It was among the peasantry that the Communist parties in the
Balkans  had more  support  than among any other  social  group.  The  more  rural  and
underdeveloped a country, the more confident and stronger the Communist party and its
power9.  The  lack  of  a  substantial  middle  class  or  petit  bourgeoisie  in  the  Balkans
contributed to an easier and smoother acquisition and maintenance of  power by the
Communists  who  faced  virtually  no  organized  opposition,  as  they  did  in  the  more
developed Socialist Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
10 In Yugoslavia, Tito’s arguably well legitimized rule was in a large part determined by the
strategic choices made after his break with Stalin and by his ability to hold the Yugoslav
Federation together with little cost. With Tito and Titoism, the conception of Moscow as
an invincible Communist monopoly was destroyed and an alternative model of socialism
provided. In her heyday under Tito, Yugoslavia became, indeed, history’s first example of
an affluent, or at least semi-affluent, Marxist society, in which the state pursued policies
to promote the material and immaterial satisfactions of the individual rather than to
achieve a purely collective well-being.
11 In  Albania,  the  smallest  and the  poorest  Communist  country  in  Eastern Europe,  the
Communists attained a stronger support among the predominantly agrarian population
than in any other country right from the start. Szelényi and Szelényi rightly observe that
the  more  impoverished  the  East  European  countries  the  more  dramatic  the
improvements10. There is no doubt that the economic life in most of these countries after
World War II,  particularly in the Balkans,  was a good deal more affluent than in the
period between the two wars.  There is also no denying the greater economic justice,
security, life expectancy, and social integration that most East Europeans enjoyed under
various  periods  of  Communist  rule.  In  Albania,  in  particular,  the  strikingly  rapid
economic  growth  experienced  in  the  1950s  and  1960s,  which  contrasted  with  the
extremely low initial level seemed enormous, as well as considerable achievements made
in social  equality,  housing,  employment,  literacy,  health care,  education,  and culture,
impressed  the  population.  All  these  were  credited  to  Hoxha’s  leadership,  further
bolstering his  popularity and the legitimacy of   his  rule.  One need not  be reminded,
Legitimation crisis of state socialism
Balkanologie, Vol. II, n° 1 | 2007
3
however, that all these strides were amplified and filtered in a mystified form through
the  state-controlled  propaganda  machine :  newspapers,  radio,  television,  public
gatherings, speeches. Information was disseminated with repetition of such absolutes as :
« the most democratic system in history », « the happiest nation in the world », « one
hundred per cent electoral participation », « one hundred per cent of votes in favor of the
regime ».
12 In Bulgaria, the second least industrialized East European country, initial support for the
Communists  and  consent  on  their  title  to  rule  was  largely  achieved  due  to  Georgi
Dimitrov’s immense popularity and the good record of the Communist resistance against
the Axis, a factor which was absent in post-War Rumania. This, however, can not be said
for Todor Zhivkov,  who led one of  the least imaginative Communist rules in Eastern
Europe.
13 To  summarize,  three  important  factors  may  explain  why  Communist  rule  in  South
Eastern Europe remained unchallenged, unlike that of Central European countries,  by
strong  rational-critical  opposition  movements  or  mass  upheavals :  a)  their  more
predominant  agrarian  and  backward  character ;  b)  stronger  initial  support  for  the
Communist parties ; and c) harsher repression of political opponents. Not only was there
nothing among the Balkan countries to compare with the Hungarians’ 1956 revolution or
the Polish recurrent rebellions, but there was not even any serious resistance that could
threaten  the  power  system.  Nor  were  there  any  forms  of  organized  opposition  or
working-class activism in the hard-line Communist states of the Balkans. Even if they
were sporadic attempts to oppose the established political course, they were nipped in
the bud.  Seemingly,  the population in these countries had less incentive to press for
change  until  events  in  the  Soviet  Union  set  into  motion  a  cumulative  process  that
resulted in the dramatic collapse of the entire system in all  countries of Central and
Eastern Europe.
14 Although all the Balkan Communist states had legitimation problems and legitimation
deficits, they did not experience legitimation crises like the Communist rules in Central
Europe. « Legitimation needs », Habermas observes, « do not have to culminate in a crisis »
11.  Yet,   whenever  Communist  leaders  and  top  officials  were  purged  and  succession
problems emerged, whenever domestic economies failed to produce more than rationed
food for the growing populations, whenever the younger generation questioned the old
realities  and practices and social  integration was endangered,  there was a condition,
albeit not always clearly manifested, of legitimation crisis. Kateb argues that
a  legitimation  crisis  need  not  be  a  definite  thing...  It  could  exist  without  full
explicitness, without people knowing how really disaffected or hostile they were. In
the past, great political and social convulsions have sometimes come as a surprise
to  everyone,  including  the  disaffected  and  the  hostile.  Some  incident  or
opportunity, or some quick, sharp change in condition was needed to crystallize
and then to energize the sentiments of crisis.12
 
The « New Course »
15 The move from Stalinist orthodoxy, the new policy of “peaceful coexistence” and a range
of fundamental ideological revisions and revisionist policies that were carried out by the
20th Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR (1956) and which were more or less
pursued in all Central and East European countries in the late 1950s and 1960s, except for
Albania and, of course, Yugoslavia, which has always been a special case, may be seen as
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attempts to impede the erosion of regime legitimacy in these countries. These changes
sought  to give the system a more “human face”,  making limited adjustments  to the
system, and producing a certain amount of “liberalism” and some breathing room to
carry out economic reforms without risking massive civil disobedience. Osiatynski labels
the  period  from  1956  until  the  mid-sixties,  during  which  the  “New  Course”  was
implemented, as a period of « nationalist communism »13. As argued by Brown, the aim
behind this “new course” adopted by Khrushchev and the new ruling elites in Central and
Eastern Europe was to make the Communist system more viable, more legitimate, and
more attractive to its citizens14.
16 The history of East European socialism provides a number of examples of Communist
parties and leaders’ attempts to restore or renew the basis of their internal legitimacy
and even generate legitimacy in the international arena for their rules with nationalistic
rhetoric and by carefully crafted national programs which were directed against Soviet
supremacy15. Tito, Hoxha, and Ceauşescu seemed to use such nationalistic rhetoric more
successfully then others. However, efforts to introduce alternative models of socialism,
such as Gomulka’s “Polish Road to Socialism” and Kádár’s “Hungarian Socialism” were
also of some success in infusing internal legitimacy for their regimes. As Chirot observes,
« in Poland and Hungary, foreign loans started to be used simply to purchase consumer
goods to make people happier, to shore up the crumbling legitimacy of regimes that had
lost what youthful vigor they had once possessed and were now viewed simply as tools of
a backward occupying power. This worked until the bills came due, and prices had to be
raised »16.
17 During  this  period,  leaderships  changed  throughout  Central  and  Eastern  Europe.
Whenever  Soviet  rulers  lost  confidence  in  East  European party  leaders,  the  Kremlin
engineered such changes in an effort  to restore orthodox control.  Local  leaders who
resisted Soviet  demands or  attempted to  pursue an independent  route  to  building a
socialist society were replaced with those more pliant to  Moscow. It was quite logical
that changes among leadership groups in Central and Eastern Europe would indeed follow
major shifts among political elites in the Soviet Union.
 
Tito, Hoxha, Kádár
18 Tito and Hoxha, the only Communist leaders in Eastern Europe who had deserted the
Soviet-ruled Communist bloc, were the only ones who continued to rule firmly and even
consolidate their powers. Neither was ever seriously challenged by political opponents,
and their legitimating charismatic myth remained virtually intact throughout their lives.
However,  after the  break  with  the  Soviet  Union,  both  domestic  and  international
circumstances for Albania and Yugoslavia differed in every respect.  Tito’s  Yugoslavia
opened  its  doors  to  Western  diplomatic  and  commercial  ties  and  to  foreign  capital
investment, becoming the only Communist country accorded most-favored-nation status
in trade with the United States, and raising the living standards higher than virtually all
other socialist countries. Not only did Yugoslavia receive vast infusions of aid from the
West, it also enjoyed wide recognition for its “original”, albeit failing, self-management
model of  socialism and its  leading role in the world-wide movement of  “non-aligned
states”.
19 Albania went the opposite way, closing its doors even more to the outside world and
severely restricting not only the movement of people but also the flow of information
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into and within the country. After Hoxha’s break with China in 1976, a new Constitution
proclaimed “self-reliance” to be the main principle of socialist construction in Albania,
prohibiting any foreign credit, aid, or investment. Such a go-it-alone policy inevitably led
to severe economic slowdown and pervasive shortages of food, clothing, and services.
Maintaining Hoxha’s legitimate authority during such a period of widespread personal
hardship was not easy. Indeed, it is hard to gauge Hoxha’s success in the 1970s and first
half  of  the 1980s in engendering support  for Albanian Communist  leadership and its
policies. Much of the earlier euphoria had dissipated but large segments of the population
continued to follow the Party elite giving at least tacit support to its policies.
20 The legitimacy of the party-state rule and its leaders in Albania during the 1970s and the
1980s might be viewed as based, in part, on negative rather than positive appeals. The
time of “spectacular achievements” was over. The country went through a long period of
stagnation, consecutive economic failures, and severe political restrictions for its citizens.
21 A similar situation existed in other countries, particularly in Bulgaria and Rumania. This
led to deep and widespread disaffection with economic and political realities, seriously
affecting the leadership’s legitimacy. Citizens in all these countries began to question :
Why are there shortages ? Why are there hardships ? Why is political control so strict ?
What has brought these about ?
22 Albanian leadership, unlike the Soviet-controlled regimes of the Socialist block, justified
themselves and the economic hardships with the “emergency” argument : we are the sole
truly socialist country and the very citadel of Marxism -Leninism. For that reason, we are
entirely surrounded by a hostile world, by powerful enemies who regard us as “a thorn in
their flesh” and try to isolate us from the outside world and make us give up our socialist
ways17.  This  rationale,  as  presented  to  the  Albanian  people,  was  aimed  not  only  at
camouflaging the reverse of Communist ideology from a legitimizer of revolution to one
of  unconditional  obedience,  it  was also an attempt to divert  attention from pressing
domestic problems,  misdeeds,  and incompetence of the leadership by blaming others for
the failures of the system and the broken promises of the earlier days of Communist
takeover. Yet, such a policy of concealment and overindoctrination came  at the expense
of the power’s stability and legitimacy. It  could turn, as in fact it  did,  into deep and
widespread disappointment  with and alienation from the system.  As  Betrand Russell
pointed out long ago, a policy of concealment often produces effects exactly opposite of
those intended. « Some, at least, of the unpleasant facts which had been kept dark are
likely to become patent to all,  and the more men have been made to live in a fool’s
paradise, the more they will be horrified and discouraged by the reality. Revolution or
sudden collapse is much more probable in such circumstances than when free discussion
has prepared the public mind for painful events »18.
23 In all other East European countries, promises neglected by the old leaders were renewed
and amplified by the new governing teams in the 1960s and the 1970s in hope of restoring
their regimes’ political legitimacy. Yet, only a reformed Hungarian state socialism, known
as  “goulash  Communism”  under  János  Kádár,  arguably  one  of  the  most  popular
Communist leaders in the 1960s and 1970s,  was able to refurbish a certain degree of
legitimacy. Kádár’s strategy of « he who is not against us is with us » proved successful in
allowing his regime to survive the trauma of 1956 and to restore its legitimate authority
by ceasing repression and allowing intelligentsia some rights to dissent19.
24 However, this does not suggest that Communist rule was established and remained for
such a long time only on the basis of its legitimacy.  As Collins points out,  « political
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domination does not depend solely on legitimacy. Widespread emotions of legitimacy
make it easier to rule ; but the existence of armaments in the hands of a few can enforce
domination a good deal of the time, especially in the absence of some strongly organized
movement of revolt, which itself would require a strong countralegitimacy »20.
25 Once established, the Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, like other forms
of rule, could survive and, indeed, maintained their power much of the time by routine
and persuasion, though with a relatively low degree of legitimacy. Even after great loss of
legitimacy has occurred, a state can remain quite stable, and certainly invulnerable to
internal mass-based revolts, especially if its coercive organizations remain coherent and
effective21.
 
The Death of a System
26 Describing legitimate authority as the capacity of a government to maintain confidence in
the  power  system,  Hannah  Arendt  wrote  that  « no  revolution  ever  succeeded,  few
revolutions ever started, so long as the authority of the body politic was indeed intact »22.
Her view is once again fully confirmed in the East European revolutions of 1989-1990. The
gradual erosion of the legitimacy of East European socialism, which eventually brought
about the collapse of the entire system, was an inescapable result of several political,
ideological, economic, and cultural factors.
27 In light of the above discussion, it is reasonable to consider the main causes that deprived
state socialism of legitimacy. The main arguments in the recent scholarly debate focus on
two major factors, which Kolakowski metaphorically terms the “body” (the economy) and
the “mind” (the ideology)23.  These two factors, indeed, form the core of all attempted
explanations.
 
The Body
28 A  common  view  in  current  scholarship  holds  that  the  decisive  factor  draining  the
legitimacy of the Socialist system was the inefficiency of Sovietism as an economic order,
its  repeated  failures  to  fulfill  people’s  increasing  expectations  and  even  their  basic
economic demands. Such a view derives from the belief in the primacy of the economy
vis-à-vis politics, which, as Luhmann observes, is manifested through the extent to which
« judgement of political success is made to depend on economic success »24. According to
this  view,  Communist-party states  based their  claim to  legitimate authority  on their
ability to promote economic growth, to provide a steady and improving flow of goods and
services, even promising their citizenry to catch up with and overtake the standard of
living  of  advanced  capitalist  societies.  Despite  some  initial  economic  and  social
achievements, it became clear that the socialist state was unable to deliver on economic
promises, hence its legitimacy was undermined.
29 Whatever reasons can be provided to explain the legitimacy loss of state socialism, there
is  one  point  on  which  there  is  a  general  consensus  among  scholars  of  comparative
politics :  regime legitimacy, and socialism is no exception to this rule,  is significantly
correlated with the efficiency of the system, efficiency understood as actual performance
of the government, the extent to which it satisfies the basic functions as the population at
large and key power groups see them25. Viewed from this point, the Soviet-type system,
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although  extremely  effective,  effectiveness  defined  here  as  the  capacity  to  attain
objectives, was, paradoxically, extraordinarily wasteful and inefficient. McSweeney and
Tempest emphasize this point in the context of a series of comparative disadvantages
with the West, which demonstrate the implausibility of socialism to prove its claimed
superiority over capitalism26.  These authors point particularly to the consumer boom
experienced by the major capitalist economies in the mid-1980s, a time during which all
East European countries were afflicted by unprecedented low, and falling, growth rates. It
was difficult, these authors assert, not to link the efficiency of the market economies to
their social and political systems.
30 A number of authors develop a similar argument :  it was the failure of “real existing
socialism” to  promote  productivity27 and  the  perception  of  a  rapidly  growing
technological  and economic gap between state  socialist  economies  and the advanced
market economies28 that played the most decisive role in the decline of the legitimacy of
state socialism and pushed the Communist elites to initiate economic reforms. As people
began to measure the economic performance of their socialist system no longer against
the backwardness of the past but against the advanced capitalist economies, they realized
the deficiency of  state  socialism as  an economic and political  order  and pressed for
change.  The  sharp  contrast  between  East  and  West  thus  helped  to  delegitimize  the
Communist ideology, the socialist practices, and the ruling elites29. As argued by Nee and
Lian, « generally speaking, when a communist party opens its door to the outside world,
people there immediately recognize the large gap of living standards between western
countries  and  the  socialist  state.  Future  expectation  might  speed  up  the  decline  of
commitment to the party »30.
 
The Mind
31 Another  line  of  argument  refers  to  the  ideological  failures  of  state  socialism as  the
determining factor which deprived the system of all moral validity and drained away the
reservoir  of  popular  support.  This  argument  is  elaborated  with  particular  clarity  by
Kolakowski, who argues that the basis of legitimacy of the Communist rule was primarily
derived from the ideological principles that justified the organization of the Soviet-type
society and established its place in history31. Hence, Kolakowski points out, totalitarian
Communist states in Eastern Europe could survive their highly inefficient and wasteful
economies as long as the ideological devices served to justify the system32.
32 Following this rationale,  one might then argue :  when peoples’  beliefs in an ideology
which  justifies  a  given  order  of  production  and  distribution  erodes,  the  system’s
legitimacy declines and vanishes. Consequently, the system loses its raison d’être. In the
case of the Soviet-type systems, with the erosion of Communist ideology, the main pillar
upon which the claim to legitimate authority had been historically based, the roots of the
establishment were dried up and the entire building fell apart. Fukuyama makes a similar
point asserting that « the critical weakness that eventually toppled these strong states
was in the last analysis a failure of legitimacy – that is, a crisis on the level of ideas »33.
The underlying idea of such an argument is that if beliefs have power, as history, the
distant and the recent, clearly illustrates, then a crises of beliefs will most certainly affect
the strength of power systems and undermine their legitimacy. Beliefs in the legitimacy
of a given order and the subjects’ willingness to submit to a particular policy or to a
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government may be altered because of new beliefs, or new insights into old ones, and
because of changes in perceptions of the established system.
 
The Body Politics
33 Chirot,  Szelényi  and  Szelényi,  de  Gaay  Fortman  and  other  authors  also  reject  an
exclusively economic explanation for the erosion of the legitimacy of state socialism and
the demise of the system as too simple34. These authors emphasize the political aspect of
state socialism, its inability to develop as a democratic system rather than its ideological
failures or economic weakness. « It is quite imaginable that the major weakness of the
socialist  project  was  not  economic  at  all :  it  was  political.  The  major  problem with
socialism was not that it did not work as an economic system, but that it was unable to
establish  itself  as  a  democratic  system  and  in  the  long  run  this  undermined  its
legitimacy »35.
34 It is common knowledge that the economic growth in virtually all the former Communist
states began slowing, even when based on their own estimations, since the latter part of
the 1960s. All socialist states came to a turning point in their overall economic conditions
somewhere in the 1970s. None of them was able to overcome the shortage of production,
which became particularly significant in the early 1980s. In the period between 1965 and
1985, the rate of increase of GNP in the Soviet Union, for instance, fell from 8 % to 3,2 %36.
In  short,  the  socialist  system resulted  in  enormous  wastage  of  human and  material
resources  and  inefficiency37.  Such  a  system,  based  on  central  planning,  became
increasingly  incapable  of  supplying  expanding  demands.  Menshikov  has  remarkably
defined  the  socialist  system  as  one  which  tends  to  « recreate  or  reproduce  deficit
conditions ».  By  killing  incentives,  state  socialism  continuously  reproduces  and
reestablishes « conditions of inadequate supply and abundant demand »38.
35 Yet, the economic decline of socialist states, which further escalated by the late 1970s and
during the 1980s, only chipped away at the already fragile political legitimacy of their
government. In other words, economic problems assumed critical importance only after
an initial erosion or delegitimization of existing authority. As Kolakowski argues, it was
not the level of absolute or even relative material satisfaction to which the collapse of the
communist regime may be attributed, but the inexorable erosion of belief in Communism
and  the  changes  in  peoples’  mentality.  « All  the  unfulfilled  promises  and  dashed
expectations of a better life fuel the revolutionary energy. But the real source of this
energy is to be looked for in changes in mentality ». This author concludes : « perhaps,
the  strongest  case  against  Marx’s  immortal  phrase  that  “social  being  determines
consciousness” is provided by the history of the states that have assimilated this very
phrase as part of their ideology »39.
 
A Catch 22 ?
36 For either of the above hypotheses there is a good deal of supporting evidence ; however,
neither is subject to convincing verification or falsification. For it is impossible to state
firmly  whether  it  was  the  failure  of  Communist  ideology  that  led  to  irrational  and
wasteful socialist economies thereby delegitimating state socialism, or the consecutive
economic failures in all socialist countries which delegitimized the Communist ideology
and the political system in which this ideology was embodied. This does not, of course,
Legitimation crisis of state socialism
Balkanologie, Vol. II, n° 1 | 2007
9
mean that the two arguments simply lie parallel to one another ; they are dialectically
related to one another in such a way that « economic collapse may have been as much the
result of the lack of political legitimacy as its cause »40.  Therefore, neither a one-sided
economic  interpretation  nor  a  one-sided  ideological  explanation  can  provide  a
satisfactory answer to the question of the demise of socialism. Understanding the causes
of  the withdrawal of  legitimacy of  state socialism requires a combination of  the two
perspectives.
37 Or, one might well conclude with Ismail Kadare that it may still be too soon to speak
about the causes of the demise of Communism in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union.
For we are not as yet far enough away to grasp and render a judgement on the historical
landscape in which Communism arose, expanded, developed, and collapsed. « The record
of events is too fresh to be gauged with any precision. We have no way of knowing its
victories  and defeats,  since...the eye is  bound to see amiss  -  so much so that  where
Communism has triumphed it may seem to have been vanquished and, inversely, where it
has appeared invulnerable it may in fact have been beaten »41.
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ABSTRACTS
Employing a comparative historical approach, this article examines the differences that existed
between the Visegrád countries, on one side, and the Balkan countries, on the other, with regard
to the legitimacy of their communist rule. Among the later, the article focuses primarily on the
cases of Albania and the former Yugoslavia as deviants from the more general pattern of the
Soviet-block countries. The article argues why legitimation crisis of state socialism broke out
mainly – and most dramatically – in East Central Europe and not in the Balkans.
Utilisant une approche historique comparative, l’auteur analyse les différences entre les pays de
Visegrad et ceux des Balkans, en regard de la légitimité de leur direction communiste. En ce qui
concerne  les  Balkans,  l’auteur  se  penche  plus  particulièrement  les  cas  de  l’Albanie  et  de
l’ancienne Yougoslavie, déviants par rapport au modèle soviétique applicable au bloc de l’Est.
L’article explique pourquoi la crise de légitimité du communisme s’est principalement déroulé, et
d’une manière dramatique, en Europe centrale et non dans les Balkans.
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